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High economic growth rates after 
World War II characterized both 
socialism and capitalism. There were 
impressive results in the former 
socialist block, Western Europe, USA, 
and Japan. Apart from these models 
based on private and state ownership, 
the fastest economic growth for some 
time was recorded in the former 
Yugoslavia under social ownership. The 
issue of property rights despite being 
subject to comparative analyses 
pointing to more efficiency of one 
versus another type of property did not 
matter much in those growth rates. 
 
Only in mid 1980s when centralist and 
self-management socialism languished 
before making their transition to a 
market economy, scholars began to 
recognize property rights as a key to 
economic efficiency. Much attention 
was paid to how performance is 
affected when ownership rights are 
incomplete (e.g. separation of control 
and residual rights in social property) 
and/or more complete (like in private 
property). This article looks at the 
redefinition or privatization of social 
ownership in the successor states of the 
former Yugoslavia, and identifies the 
causes of smaller effects than expected 
of this redefinition. 
 
“The agents of a prince regard the wealth 
of their master as inexhaustible; are 
careless at what price they buy; are 
careless at what price they sell; are 
careless at what expense they transport 
his goods from one place to another. 
Those agents frequently live with the 
profusion of princes, and sometimes too, 
in spite of that profusion, and by a proper 
method of making up their accounts, 
acquire the fortunes of princes.”1  
1. Introduction 
 
The onset of the transition process in 
the former Yugoslavia coincided with 
the economic and political 
disorganization in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet 
Union. It is argued that its scope, speed, 
and success depended on initial 
conditions, policies implemented, and 
the external environment.2 Having 
                                                 
1 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature 
And Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book 
V, Chapter II, Part I. (Edinburgh, [1776]), 




2 See among others, Svetozar Pejovich, 
“Institutions, Nationalism and the Transition 
Process in Eastern Europe,” in Liberalism 
and the Economic Order, eds. Frankel P. 
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realized that the economic transition 
through privatization appeared as 
inevitable, the question was how to find 
methods of giving enterprises away 
from the state into a more efficient use 
in private hands. On the eve of that 
transformation in CEE, few managed to 
comprehensively assess how difficult 
the road ahead was going to be. The 
doubt expressed was that the economic 
reforms and reallocation of resources 
that were about to occur, perhaps would 
produce the required gains in the longer 
run, whereas during the process and in 
the short run they may hurt a majority 
of the citizens, which in turn could 
resist the reforms initiated and 
undermine democracy. The 
governments too, were to some extent 
aware that gains will be preceded by 
some inevitable pain.3 That the 
economic reforms during the early 
transition incur a high social cost, has 
proved not to be an accident, but those 
                                                       
Ellen, Fred Miller, and Jeffrey Paul 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 65-78; Michael Ellman, 
“Transformation, Depression, and 
Economics: Some Lessons,” Journal of 
Comparative Economics 19 (1: 1994): 1-21; 
Leszek Balcerowicz, “The Interplay 
Between Economic and Political 
Transition,” in Lessons from the Economic 
Transition: Central and Eastern Europe in 
the 1990s, ed. Salvatore Zeccini (Norwell: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 153-
167. 
3 Such an early assessment was provided by 
Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the 
Market. Political and Economic Reforms in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 136. 
who mostly benefited in short run were 
the ones that initiated them. The 
winners were a small concentrated 
group who gained at the expense of the 
rest of the population, the losers. In the 
longer run, the gains appear to be more 
dispersed depending on the barriers of 
the winners’ ability to block the gains 
of the others.4 
 
Among many interdependent factors, 
initial conditions played a significant 
role in the outcomes of the transition 
reforms and privatization. For example, 
the initial conditions of the Yugoslav 
transition path were characterized by 
dramatic events and interethnic 
conflicts that led to the dissolution of 
the Federation, with political and 
economic consequences for the 
republics that became independent 
states. Such a transition during the 
1990s according to Jan Svejnar was 
more related to turbulent political 
events and civil wars than economic 
reforms.5  
 
Political disorganization and distorted 
environment has always been an 
obstacle to transition and privatization. 
Policy makers tended to favor the worst 
scenario during transition rather than 
continue status quo of socialist 
economy. This then had adverse effects 
on the restructuring process as a result 
                                                 
4 Joel S. Hellmann, “Winners Take All: The 
Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist 
Transitions,” World Politics 50 (1998). 
5 Jan Svejnar, “Transition Economies: 
Performance and Challenges,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 16 (1:2002): 3-28. 
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of dramatic economic decline.6 While 
this refers to the early transition period, 
it should be remembered that 
privatization has promised more than 
actually achieved even in a stable 
country when it was implemented for 
the first time in large scale – the United 
Kingdom (UK).7  
 
To come out with an assessment on the 
impact of privatization in the successor 
states of the former Yugoslavia, the 
article begins with a brief review of 
different types of property and their 
associated incentives with respect to 
efficiency. Section two outlines the 
reasons that led to privatization of 
                                                 
6 Gérard Roland, “The Role of Political 
Constraints in Transition Strategies”, 
Economics of Transition 2 (1: 1994): 27-41.  
7 This may not be a relevant comparison to 
the privatization in CEE for two reasons: 
first, the UK (and the West) privatized 
publicly-owned enterprises as opposed to 
privatization of commercial enterprises in 
CEE; and second, privatizations in the 
public sector in Western countries may be 
referred to a reform within the existing 
system. In spite of this, there is one 
important thing to remember. Privatization 
in the UK has had smaller effects on overall 
economic performance and efficiency than 
the theory of property rights had established. 
The winners in the short run were the 
companies that came more efficient from 
their better position on the eve of 
privatization, against a larger group of losers 
with unemployment peaking 11 percent in 
1986. For a thorough investigation of the 
British privatization experience from 1979 
to 1997, see Massimo Florio, The Great 
Divestiture: Evaluating the Welfare Impact 
of the British Privatization 1979 – 1997 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004). 
public and state ownership. Similarly, 
the necessity of privatizing social 
ownership and the methods of 
privatization implemented are discussed 
in section three. The section continues 
with an assessment of the impact of 
privatization methods on corporate 
governance and restructuring. Section 
four summarizes a number of causes 
leading to smaller privatization results 
than expected by grouping them as 
internal and external factors in separate 
sub-sections. Section five draws 
conclusions. 
 
2. Different types of property rights as 
incentives for economic efficiency  
 
In broader terms, property can be 
understood as a set or system of rules 
regulating the right to, and control of, 
material resources.8 In this way, the 
term property rights is used in 
economics to denote the essence of the 
property. The enforcement of property 
rights is made depending on political 
system of a country and the economic 
system it wanted to establish through 
that enforcement. Thus capitalist 
democracy enforced the right to private 
property as a foundation of market 
economy. Centralist socialism enforced 
the right to state property and planned 
economy. The self-management 
socialist regime, as the institution 
responsible for enforcing the right to 
social property that was unique to 
former Yugoslavia, defined the means 
                                                 
8 Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private 
Property (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 
31. 
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of production as socially owned.9 That 
is, the society as a whole was supposed 
to be the owner of social assets (thus, 
social ownership). As such, social 
ownership had both similarities and 
                                                 
9 When Yugoslav ideologists introduced 
self-management they did not know exactly 
how the system would operate since there 
was no theory about it. But even during its 
operation, the Yugoslav economists have 
not developed any theory, nor did they make 
any notable contribution to it. Self-
management attracted the attention of 
Western economists who where the first 
attempting to create a theory of a Labor-
managed Firm (LMF) or the Workers’ 
Management, as the Yugoslav Socially-
owned Enterprises (SOEs) were identified. 
The first article was published by Benjamin 
N. Ward, “The Firm in Illyria: Market 
Syndicalism,” American Economic Review 
48 (1958): 556-589. During the 1970s the 
interest grew among some economists from 
CEE such as Jaroslav Vanek, The General 
Theory of Labor-Managed Market 
Economies (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1970); Jan Vanek, The Economics of 
Workers’ Management: A Yugoslav Case 
Study (London: George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd., 1972); Jaroslav Vanek, The Labor-
Managed Economy: Essays (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1977); and Saul 
Estrin,  Self-management: Economic Theory 
and Yugoslav Practice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press,1983). Branko 
Horvat, The Political Economy of Socialism: 
A Marxist Social Theory (Oxford: Martin 
Robertson, 1982) and Aleksandar Bajt, 
Samoupravni Oblik Društevene Svojine 
(Self-management Type of Social 
Ownership) (Zagreb: Globus, 1988) were 
few exceptions among Yugoslav economists 
to have contributed to the theory of 
Workers’ Management.  
differences with state and private 
ownership. 
 
Social property and social ownership is 
a relatively new category of property 
rights, unique to the former Yugoslavia, 
and the analysis of it is relatively new 
as well. Since it was introduced in the 
early 1950s, no significant attention 
was paid to its analysis until the study 
by Eirik Furubotn and Svetozar 
Pejovich who believed that one could 
not present a satisfactory theory of the 
Yugoslav firm without an explicit 
reference to its property rights structure. 
This was due to some of the specific 
features of this type of property rights, 
in particular: (i) enterprises were not 
allowed to own assets; and (ii) selling 
and buying of the firm’s assets only 
amounted to a transfer of the right to 
use but not the right to alienate or 
destroy those assets.10 While under 
capitalism the market signals to 
producers which goods should be 
produced, under self-management 
producers determined what products 
consumers could buy. 
 
A vast theoretical literature has evolved 
on comparative performance of 
different property rights. An article of 
1937 laid the basic foundations of 
allocation and use of property by the 
firm (its owner or management) and by 
someone else outside the firm such as 
                                                 
10 Eirik Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich, 
”Property Rights and the Behaviour of the 
Firm in a Socialist State: The Example of 
Yugoslavia,” Zeitschrift für 
Nationalökonomie 30 (1970): 430-454. 
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the state.11 Interactions between 
allocation and use involve a relationship 
between master and servant or principal 
and agent of property. The principal 
(the state or society) may engage the 
agent (in the former Yugoslavia they 
were the workers) to perform some 
actions on behalf of the principal, 
including full decision making authority 
delegated to the agent.12 
 
The central point of the theory of 
property rights is that the firm’s 
performance depends on objective 
function and incentives. State, social 
and private ownership are different in 
this respect. Private ownership has 
incentives to reduce costs and reap 
more market-based benefits compared 
to state ownership.13 Enterprise profit is 
allocated by its owners; private owners 
allocate their profit according to their 
wishes, state authorities allocate the 
profit of state enterprises, and the 
decision of the working collective or 
members of the company allocated the 
profit of Socially-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs).   
 
Since the pioneering article by 
Benjamin N. Ward in 1958, the analysis 
of the behavior of an SOE has been 
                                                 
11 Ronald H. Coase, “The Nature of the 
Firm,” Economica 4 (1937): 386-405.  
12 Michael C. Jensen and William H. 
Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 
3 (4:1976): 305-360.  
13 Andrei Shleifer, “State Versus Private 
Ownership,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 12 (4:1988): 133-150.  
based on comparing its performance 
with that of a capitalist firm. Ward who 
coined the term ‘Illyrian firm’, 
considered it a less independent form of 
capitalist firm, and as such with the 
failures that makes it less efficient. 
Ward demonstrated that the SOEs 
would perform less efficiently than 
capitalist firms, citing among other 
reasons, their response to a price 
increase (or decrease) is the opposite of 
the capitalist firm’s response. He also 
showed that in these firms investment 
patterns will be distorted in comparison 
with capitalist firms due to incentives of 
the working collective to maximize 
individual incomes.14 Such assumptions 
about the behavior of SOEs were based 
on competitive self-management for 
which Jaroslav Vanek created the most 
noteworthy general theory. Assuming 
perfect competition and the behavior of 
the system as a whole, Vanek along the 
line of Ward argued that a Labor-
managed Economy (LME) will respond 
to aggregate demand by the change in 
prices rather the change in output 
and/or employment.15  
 
For a society, it is more important that 
economic choices what, how and for 
whom, are preceded by techniques, 
rules or customs which resolve the 
inefficiencies that arise from the use of 
scarce resources, i.e. define property 
                                                 
14 Benjamin N. Ward, “The Firm in Illyria: 
Market Syndicalism”, American Economic 
Review 48 (1958): 556-589. 
15 Jaroslav Vanek, The General Theory of 
Labor-Managed Market Economies (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1970).  
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rights clearly.16 In self-management 
socialism, ownership rights were 
politically imposed and the residual 
rights were used by the central authority 
to monitor managers. The managers’ 
limited incentive to monitor and 
condemn workers in case of abuse or 
theft is viewed as an adverse outcome 
because s/he is elected by the workers 
who can dismiss him/her.17 This 
ambiguous role and actions by the 
Yugoslav principal (central authority) 
and agent (management of SOEs) was 
the underlying reason for some of the 
inefficiencies of social ownership. In 
the system of Workers’ Management 
which in its largest part seems to have 
been operating as a black box, the 
workers officially were declared and in 
fact they felt to be the true rulers of 
SOEs but hardly were; the role of the 
state and its agents was always 
significant.18 In theory, the Yugoslav 
workers were the agents of the state, 
though in practice the state played a 
double role (as principal and agent). 
Having in mind the labyrinth in which 
self-management operated, the 
Yugoslav economy could not be a fully 
and competitive LME, which various 
                                                 
16 Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, 
“The Property Rights Paradigm”, The 
Journal of Economic History 33 (1: 1973): 
16-27. 
17 Michael C. Jensen and William H. 
Meckling, “Rights and Production 
Functions: An Application to Labor-
Managed Firms and Codetermination”, 
Journal of Business 52 (4:1979): 469-506.  
18 Harold Lydall, Yugoslav Socialism: 
Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984). 
authors used as an example to establish 
standard theories.  
 
Due to unclear property rights, resource 
allocation under social ownership was 
considered sub-optimal. Regardless the 
theory, self-management in aggregate 
terms fared better than capitalism and 
centralist socialism. At the beginning of 
its introduction it was lucky to enjoy 
significant aid from Western 
countries.19 Any economic system with 
such a support would have recorded 
obvious results. But the fact that the 
fastest economic growth in the world in 
absolute terms continued for more than 
a decade after the aid was received, 
indicates that there were other 
determinants. Above all, the workers 
motivation for work through self-
management and the enthusiasm of the 
Yugoslav communists expressed by the 
slogan “we” and “they” intimating a 
comparison of their socialist version 
with all Eastern block, were the factors 
of significant impact. Table 1 below 
summarizes the results of self-
management from 1953 to 1965, the 
period which can be considered as its 
golden age recording the fastest 
economic growth in the world. 
 
                                                 
19 Western aid included capital transfers 
from the USA, Britain and France 
amounting to $425.8 million delivered from 
1951 to 1954. See David A. Dyker, 
Yugoslavia: Socialism, Development and 
Debt (London: Routledge, 1990). 
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Table 1:  Annual rates of growth in different economic systems (from 1953 to 
1965) 
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+5.0 +4.5 -7.0 
Gini coefficient 0.25 0.21-0.26e) 0.40 
a) State socialist countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia; 
b) Capitalist countries: Greece, Ireland, Norway, and Spain; 
c) From 1954 to 1967;     
d) From 1940 to 1954, excluding the war years 1941 to 1945; 
e) Bulgaria and Poland;   
f) From 1911 to 1940, excluding the war years 1914 to 1918.
Source: Branko Horvat, The Political 
Economy of Socialism: A Marxist 
Social Theory (Oxford: Martin 
Robertson, 1982): 203-205, tables 7, 8, 
and 9, op. cit. 
 
The Yugoslav self-management was 
more efficient with output, labor, and 
combined factor productivity than 
capitalist and centrally planned 
economies during the same as well as 
different comparative periods. One 
should take the sampling of selective 
capitalist countries for comparison with 
a caution. Ireland and Norway of that 
time (when jokes from the English 
lampooned the former, and from the 
Swedes about the latter have been more 
popular), were not as they are today in 
the rank of the most developed 
countries in the world.  
 
Growth rates in self-management 
socialism should be also attributed to 
the initial low base. Nevertheless, the 
fact that the former Yugoslavia 
performed better than any other 
socialist country, is undisputed. 
Centralist socialism was able to 
mobilize more capital at a lower level 
of combined factor productivity. 
Capitalism had higher productivity than 
centralist socialism but left other 
resources, especially labor, at the lowest 
level of use. It was so in capitalism 
where capital hires labor while in 
socialism (centralist or self-managed) 
the opposite was true. High growth 
rates in the former Yugoslavia 
continued even after 1965, so for a 
period of more than two decades (from 
1952 to 1973) their annual average 
growth in percent terms was: 10.6 for 
CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 2, No. 3 
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output, 5.3 for labor, and 9.1 for 
capital.20 
 
The greatest achievement of self-
management socialism was that it had 
quickly transformed the former 
Yugoslavia from an obsolete and 
largely agricultural country to an 
industrialized and more developed 
economy and society. On the other 
hand, through the defects in operation, 
the system was vulnerable to a number 
of failures. When Saul Estrin and Will 
Bartlett used a large empirical literature 
to identify the effects of enterprise self-
management on Yugoslav economy, 
they showed that the efficiency had 
isolated the general impact of 
underdevelopment, market 
imperfections, and government 
regulation, though the growth 
performance appeared impressive by 
international comparisons.21 It is worth 
mentioning that the development gap 
between federal units that made the 
country divided as the developed North 
(Slovenia, Croatia, Vojvodina) and the 
underdeveloped South (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina – BiH, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, and Kosovo). Serbia was 
at an average level of development of 
the federation. This division was of 
                                                 
20 Saul Estrin, Self-management: Economic 
Theory and Yugoslav Practice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983).  
21 Saul Estrin and Will Bartlett, “The Effects 
of Enterprise Self-management in 
Yugoslavia: An Empirical Evidence” in 
Participatory and Self-managed Firm, eds. 
Derek C. Jones and Jan Svejnar 
(Massachusetts Toronto: Lexington Books, 
1982): 83-107. 
particular concern due to multiethnic 
composition of the country. The legacy 
of Yugoslav socialism sought as a top 
priority to narrow the inherited regional 
disparities in economic development 
through the establishment of the Federal 
Fund for Crediting Economic 
Development of Less Developed 
Regions in 1963. Regional development 
policy narrowed the gap in development 
in Montenegro and Macedonia, but not 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Kosovo where the gap actually 
increased. Therefore, the figures in 
Table 1 on basic welfare differences 
begun to decline and Gini coefficient 
increased over the period from 1965 to 
1990. As measured by incomes per 
capita, this gap between the most 
developed Slovenia and the least 
developed Kosovo increased from 1:4 
in 1953 to 1:8 by 1990.22  
 
In any case, for nearly four decades 
self-management socialism as the “third 
way” was the most interesting 
economic system in the world, from 
which a lot of things may be learned to 
generate ideas and concepts about 
different economic systems and their 
evolution. The Russian economist and 
Russia’s former acting Prime Minister, 
Yegor Gaidar, upon visiting the former 
Yugoslavia, would later describe the 
system of self-management socialism 
and his personal experience as follows: 
“And here [in Yugoslavia] I 
discover Marxism in its original 
                                                 
22 Diana Pleština, Regional Development in 
Communist Yugoslavia: Successes, Failure 
and Consequences (San Francisco: 
Westview Press, Boulder, 1992).  
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form….I was lucky that I happened 
to be where I was, because 
Yugoslavia was the testing ground 
for worker control and market 
socialism. As I tried to sort out the 
ups and downs of the economic 
reform, I realized how hopelessly 
my own knowledge of economics 
was.”23 
 
Former Yugoslavia initiated and was 
one of the three founders of the Non-
Aligned Movement established in 1955 
that became the third influential block 
in the world and remained so until the 
end of the Cold War. At home, the 
Titoist ideology sought the doctrine of 
brotherhood and unity between the 
nations and nationalities as a political 
stance of appeasement to keep the 
country together. In the late 1980s, this 
charade proved impossible and evolved 
into a bloody civil war.  
 
3. Justifying the transformation of 
different types of property into private 
property 
 
It is widely accepted that the firm’s 
efficiency depends on, or is subject to, a 
number of factors leading to different 
objectives, incentives and constraints. 
Theoretical wisdom maintains that 
private enterprises pursue profit 
maximization and have strong 
incentives to reduce costs. On these 
grounds private property is judged to be 
more efficient over public and state 
property. State and public enterprises 
                                                 
23 Yegor Gaidar, Days of Defeat and Victory 
(translated by Jane Ann Miller), (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1999), 14.  
are regarded as less efficient for a 
number of reasons, including among 
others: i) political interference in 
enterprise affairs to pursue other 
objectives that politicians want; ii) 
involvement of trade unions to lobby 
for higher wages for the workers; iii) 
employment of a greater number of 
employees than actually may be 
needed; iv) lower quality of 
management and innovation due to 
limitations by the principal and absence 
of bankruptcy threat; and v) less 
product differentiation and consumer 
orientation.24 
 
Following theoretical foundations that 
private ownership does matter for 
efficiency, privatization was generally 
supported. With this expectation, the 
UK embarked on a large scale 
privatization of public ownership. The 
British privatization program might 
have appeared as inevitable to respond 
to the ongoing decline in efficiency of 
public corporations, though it was not a 
carefully planned and controlled 
program.25 Privatization in CEE arose 
from similar reasons as in the UK. 
There were objections against centralist 
economy and state ownership but 
privatization was not considered as long 
                                                 
24 Stephen Martin and David Parker, The 
Impact of Privatisation: Ownership and 
Corporate Performance in the UK (London: 
Routledge, 1997), 5.  
25 Ahmad Galal, Leroy Jones, Pankay 
Tandon and Ingo Vogelsang, Welfare 
Consequences of Selling Public Enterprises: 
An Empirical Analysis (published for the 
World Bank by Oxford University Press, 
1994). 
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as the former Soviet Union was able to 
crush the 1956 Hungarian revolution 
and 1968 Prague Spring in former 
Czechoslovakia. Those events, if 
prevailed, could have given rise to an 
alternative way of socialism such as 
self-management, or in a more radical 
scenario, the privatization of state 
ownership. Transition and privatization 
eventually became inevitable by the end 
of 1980s, following a degeneration of 
communism from the inside and the 
decay of socialist economies in CEE.26 
It was impossible to maintain state 
ownership once the communist parties 
or the principals that monitored 
enterprises collapsed and pluralist 
political parties emerged. From thereon 
the privatization process in CEE 
preceded by a disorganization of the 
system that imposed the need for 
reallocation of resources into a property 
rights system required by a market 
economy. More specifically, this was an 
international promoted requirement 
within the well-known reform package 
– the so-called Washington Consensus.  
For Olivier Blanchard, disorganization 
is the initial phase of transition that 
continues with reallocation of 
resources, and that reallocation involves 
restructuring and reorganization. Then 
the relation between property rights 
clearly defined and incentives becomes 
                                                 
26 Yegor Gaidar, State and Evolution: 
Russia’s Search for a Free Market 
(translated by Jane Ann Miller) (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2003), 59-
62. 
obvious.27 Gérard Roland reminded that 
different ownership per se has not 
played any important role in economic 
performance from the perspective of 
general equilibrium theory. He argued 
that different ownership became central 
in economics once the theory of 
incomplete contracts was introduced, 
which saw their relevance during 
privatization in transition economies in 
terms of control rights and residual 
rights.28   
 
4. The necessity of redefining social 
ownership in the former Yugoslavia 
and her successor states  
 
 Since its introduction in the early 
1950s, the self-management system 
remained essentially unchanged until 
the initiation of economic transition in 
the late 1980s, although it underwent 
four important changes.29 The 1974 
                                                 
27 Olivier Blanchard, The Economics of 
Post-Communist Transition (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997). 
28 Gérard Roland, Transition and 
Economics: Politics, Markets, and Firms 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000). 
29 The main institutional changes and phases 
of the development of Yugoslav self-
management were: (i) the period of centrally 
planned economy (1945-52) that was similar 
to the Soviet model of socialism; (ii) the 
introduction of self-management (1952-65), 
where the process of decision-making was 
gradually decentralised; (iii) the period of 
self-managed market socialism (1965-1974) 
when market mechanisms were utilised in as 
many areas as possible, focusing on the 
activities of the SOEs operating in the 
market; and (iv) the system of ‘free 
associated labour’ (1974-1988), or 
CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 2, No. 3 
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reform of contractual socialism resulted 
in an increase in the proportion of 
enterprise revenues that were under the 
influence and control of state players. 
SOEs were under constant pressure by 
the authorities to employ more 
workers.30 Under diminished autonomy 
of the workers, outside players used 
their influence through residual rights 
and violated the main principle of self-
management, which is earning 
according to work, by redistributing 
revenues from better performing to 
under performing enterprises.31 The 
implication of that redistribution as a 
later analysis would indicate, was that 
whenever the government policies 
aimed at increasing the wealth of the 
society they could result in diminishing 
the enterprise efficiency over time.32 
 
                                                       
‘contractual socialism.’ See Saul Estrin and 
Tea Petrin, “Patterns of Entry, Exit and 
Merger in Yugoslavia,” in Entry and Market 
Contestability: An International 
Comparison, eds. Paul A. Geroski and 
Joachim Schwalbach (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1991): 204-220. 
30 Ljubomir R. Madžar, “The Illyrian Firm: 
An Alternative View”, Economic Analysis 
and Workers Management 4 (20:1986): 401-
410.  
31 Milan Vodopivec, “Determination of 
Earnings in Yugoslav Firms: Can it be 
Squared with Labor Management?”, 
Economic Development and Cultural 
Change 41 (3:1993): 623-632.  
32 Daniel L. Freisner and Robert Rosenman, 
“A Dynamic Property Rights Theory of the 
Firm”, International Journal of the 
Economics and Business 9 (3:2002): 311-
333.  
The residual rights of the state or 
government bodies over social 
ownership should also be seen from 
another point of view. They can serve 
as a reason for the government to 
interfere in the firm’s affairs, by which 
the firm’s efficiency is limited because 
the government may pursue different 
objectives referred to earlier in this 
paper. These problems are expected to 
disappear if social ownership is 
transformed into private ownership, and 
LME moves to a full market economy. 
Any market economy requires the 
establishment of unambiguously 
defined, and most importantly, 
transferable property rights. The 
challenge is that the process of 
redefining social ownership will be 
followed by claims from agents 
associated with social ownership 
(especially workers and managers), 
whose stake is not known. The workers 
believed that they ran SOEs, financed 
the investment expenditure, contributed 
to development and growth of SOE and 
thus had acquired ownership claims to 
the assets. On the other hand, when 
SOEs were not able to pay the 
minimum incomes of the workers or 
other claims on their income, they had 
to either merge with other profitable 
enterprises which would cover their 
losses, or accept the intervention by the 
state or the founding organization who 
would replace the existing management 
and restore the firm’s financial position 
(usually by subsidizing it). This formed 
the basis of ownership claims by the 
state or the funding organization. In 
cases the performance of SOEs was 
very poor, the state assisted them by 
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subsidies or rescued them from 
bankruptcy by writing off their debts, so 
SOEs in former Yugoslavia enjoyed 
soft budget constraints like state 
enterprises in CEE. 
 
During the 1980s the Yugoslav 
economy was in deep crisis facing 
hyperinflation, trade deficit, foreign 
debt, unemployment and inefficiencies 
at the micro level. The policies aimed at 
reforming self-management were no 
longer producing effects as they were 
introduced as a reaction to correct the 
previous failures rather than moving 
towards any planned necessary reform 
before the crisis appeared.33 They 
seemed unlikely to produce substantial 
changes without changing the property 
rights regime. It was decided to do so 
by the end of 1989 when the Federal 
Executive Council of former 
Yugoslavia brought in the reform to 
privatize social ownership and make 
transition towards a full market 
economy. Privatization of SOEs was 
facilitated through the Law on Social 
Capital, known as the Marković Law, 
named after Ante Marković, the last 
President of Federal Executive Council 
of former Yugoslavia. Very favorable 
terms were provided to employees; a 
discount of 30% to buy internal shares, 
which was enhanced by another 1% for 
each year of employment – thus the 
overall discount could be as high as 
70% of the nominal value of shares. 
                                                 
33 Janez Prašnikar and Vesna Prašnikar, 
“The Yugoslav Self-managed Firm in 
Historical Perspective,” Economic and 
Industrial Democracy 7 (1986): 167-187.  
Each worker could buy shares at 
nominal value up to 3 times his annual 
personal incomes. The shares were to 
be paid for within 10 years once the 
company was registered under a 
different ownership form.34 The 
implementation of this privatization 
program was short lived as in 1991 
inter-ethnic conflicts began to give the 
final stroke to political and economic 
organization of the former Yugoslavia, 
and privatization of social ownership 
remained a challenge for newly 
established successor states. 
 
4.1 Methods of privatization and 
implementation of the process: 
progress, pitfalls and setbacks  
 
Each newly independent republic of 
former Yugoslavia adopted their own 
privatization laws and established the 
relevant institutions – privatization 
agencies to carry out the process. The 
successor states, in general, opted for 
the sale of enterprise assets to insiders 
on very favorable terms as the main 
method of privatization, a pattern that, 
with modification was inherited from 
the Marković Law. Present and former 
employees in Croatia and Serbia were 
entitled to buy shares at a basic discount 
of 20% plus 1% for each year of 
employment, to be paid in installments 
over a period of 5 years. In 
Montenegro, favorable terms and 
                                                 
34 Službeni List SFRJ, Zakon o Prometu i 
Raspolaganju Društvenim Kapitalom, 
(Official Gazette of SFRJ, The Law on 
Circulation and Disposal of Social Capital), 
no. 84/89, 46/90, Beograd. 
CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 2, No. 3 
 
 237 
conditions to insiders were exactly the 
same as in the Marković Law.  
 
Provisions of the Slovenian Law on 
Privatization allocated social ownership 
to workers and society through the 
privatization scheme involving: i) the 
transfer of 40% of the enterprises’ 
shares to the three funds (20% to the 
Development Fund, 10% to the Pension 
Fund, 10% to the Restitution Fund); ii) 
20% of shares were allocated to 
employees in exchange for ownership 
certificates or vouchers; iii) 20% was 
left at the discretion of the company to 
be sold to current employees, former 
employees, and retired workers at a 
discount of 50%; and iv) the remaining 
20% was allocated for mass 
privatization program (MPP) or free 
distribution of shares to Slovenian 
citizens in exchange for ownership 
certificates. 
 
The Macedonian concept of 
privatization was based on a number of 
methods. Social capital was allocated in 
the following way: (i) 30% to 
employees as internal shares, involving 
a discount of 30% plus 1% for each 
year of employment; (ii) 15% of shares 
were to be transferred to the Pension 
Fund; and (iii) 55% of shares were left 
for sale to domestic and foreign buyers 
under equal conditions, using a variety 
of sales methods. Privatization of the 
renationalized social ownership 
proceeded under separate programs in 
the two entities of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH), and relied on a 
decentralized approach. Both programs 
envisaged mass privatization by 
distribution of ownership certificates to 
the citizens over 18 years of age in the 
Federation of BiH, and vouchers to all 
citizens in Republika Srpska. The 
citizens could use the certificates or 
vouchers to buy shares in companies to 
be sold via public offerings, tenders and 
negotiations. 
 
The last federal unit of former 
Yugoslavia and the last country in CEE 
to pass her own law on privatization 
and embark on the process was Kosovo. 
Privatization of SOEs did not follow the 
pattern observed in other Yugoslav 
successor states, probably because 
privatization became a specifically 
shaped problem. The methods of 
privatization as determined by the 
regulation passed in June 2002 
included: the establishment of 
subsidiary companies of SOEs (spin-
offs) and, voluntary liquidation. Instead 
of any discount, the employees were 
entitled to 20% of the proceeds from the 
sale of SOEs. It was meant to be a 
compensation for the loss of their self-
management rights after privatization, 
but strangely it could not and still 
cannot be included as a discount in case 
the employees buy the SOE. A 
summary with relevant details of all 
first privatization laws discussed so far 
in this section is provided in the 
Appendix to this paper.  
 
To sum up the legal frameworks on 
privatization, the characteristics of 
social ownership related the priority of 
appropriation to those who were in 
charge of managing the SOEs. Milica 
Uvalić identified the appropriation of 
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those rights or privatization of social 
ownership synonymously with 
“converting self-management rights 
into property rights.”35 The managing 
role of workers has been described by 
Karim Medjad as “a source of 
customary ownership rights.”36 There 
were exceptions or restrictions to these 
ownership rights of employees such as, 
privatization through MPP and direct 
sales either as primary or secondary 
method. 
 
Economists generally thought that the 
privatization of social ownership and 
the building of a market economy in 
former Yugoslavia would probably be 
easier than the privatization of state 
ownership in centrally planned 
economies. The Yugoslav system of 
market socialism was understood as 
something closer to a market economy 
and, as Maks Tajnikar put it, “already 
                                                 
35 Milica Uvalić, “Privatization in the 
Yugoslav Successor States: Converting Self-
management into Property Rights,” in 
Privatization Surprises in Central and 
Eastern Europe, eds. Milica Uvalić and 
Daniel Whitehead-Voughan (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 1997), 267-302.  
36 Karim Medjad, “Workers Control as a 
Source of Customary Ownership Rights: 
Evidence from the Privatization in Former 
Yugoslav Republics,” (paper presented at 
the Eleventh Conference of the International 
Association for the Economics of 
Participation, Catholic University of 




market-oriented.”37 Presumably, the 
longer experience with market-based 
elements was seen as an advantage in 
establishing a full market economy.38  
Privatization under the Marković Law 
had started in almost every federal unit 
but was halted by the outbreak of civil 
wars and the disintegration of the 
country. In Slovenia, around 400 SOEs 
embarked on autonomous privatization 
by selling shares to insiders.39 Once the 
Slovenian Law on Privatization was 
adopted, the process initiated under the 
Marković Law was stopped and 
ownership transactions were re-
examined. A similar process initiated 
by some SOEs in Croatia was not 
recognized and they were required to be 
privatized by the Croatian law only. 
The very short deadline for submitting 
applications for ownership 
transformation (14 months) meant that 
most of the 3,619 SOEs remained in the 
state portfolio. Almost half of them 
were owned by Croatian Privatization 
Fund (CPF), creating a large state sector 
                                                 
37 Maks Tajnikar, “From a Labour-Managed 
Economy to a Market Economy: A 
Contribution to Economic Transformation,” 
Atlantic Economic Journal 28 (2000): 93-
101. 
38 Milica Uvalić, Investment and Property 
Rights in Yugoslavia: The Long Transition 
to a Market Economy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
39 Uroš Korže, “Decentralized Privatization 
Strategy: Pitfalls and Benefits – Slovenia,” 
in Privatization in Central and Eastern 
Europe 1991, eds. Marko Simoneti and 
Andreja Böhm (Ljubljana: CEEPN, 1992), 2 
(140-153). 
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as a substitute for the social sector.40 
Privatization continued in phases that 
could not achieve anticipated 
objectives. After a decade of transition, 
privatization in Croatia remained 
incomplete. Among the reasons for 
slower privatization, was the fact that 
CPF did not have sufficient operational 
and professional capacities for the most 
important sectors of the economy, 
namely shipbuilding and tourism.41 As 
of 2005 privatization in Croatia was 
still an ongoing process as the CPF 
continued to hold shares in hundreds of 
companies. 
 
Even though the Macedonian Law was 
enacted in 1993, it took 20 months to 
see the first SOE privatized under its 
provisions. Until the Agency for 
Privatization was consolidated, over 
400 enterprises (1/3 of the total number 
of SOEs scheduled for privatization) 
had been transformed under the 
Marković Law.42 Differently from 
                                                 
40 Nevenka Čučković, “Privatization, 
Restructuring and Institutional Change: 
How Far has Croatia Gone?,” in 
Privatization in Post-Communist Countries, 
eds. Barbara Blaszczyk and Richard 
Woodward (Warsaw: Center for Social and 
Economic Research, 1996), 1 (53-74).  
41 Nevenka Čučković, “The Privatisation 
Process and Its Consequences for the 
Distribution of Welfare: The Case of 
Croatia,” MOCT-MOST 5 (1995): 75-90; 
Damir Ostović, “Privatization in Croatia” in 
Privatization in Central & Eastern Europe 
1995, ed. Andreja Böhm (Ljubljana: 
CEEPN, 1996), 6 (106-137). 
42 European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development – EBRD, Transition Report 
Slovenia and Croatia, those 
transformations and privatizations were 
recognized. With the remaining SOEs 
privatized under the new law, the 
process was declared completed in 
2002.  
 
The autonomous privatization that 
began under the Marković Law 
proceeded on a larger scale in Serbia 
than elsewhere in former Yugoslavia. 
Privatization was further advanced by 
the Serbian Law of 1991 so that by 
1994 the process was completed in 
1,785 or in over 53% of total number of 
enterprises to be privatized. Just in 1994 
Serbia saw the biggest retreat in 
privatization. Privatization was 
abolished in 1,556 or 87% of privatized 
enterprises after reviewing the process 
by the Agency for Privatization.43 
Revaluation due to hyperinflation of 
1993 had blocked the process and led to 
the direct state control in enterprises 
where privatization was abolished and 
those to be privatized. 
 
Until 1994 when the Montenegrin Law 
was amended, very little progress had 
been made. By the end of 1995, only 10 
enterprises had been fully privatized to 
insiders.44 Obviously, such a slow 
                                                       
1995: Investment and Enterprise 
Development (London: EBRD, 1995).   
43 Mladen Lazić and Laslo Sekelj, 
“Privatisation in Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro)”, Europe-Asia Studies 49 
(6:1997), 1057-1070.  
44 Institute for Strategic Studies and 
Prognosis - ISSP, Montenegro Economic 
Trends (Podgorica: ISSP, 2000), available 
at: 
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progress left Montenegro with the 
alternative of MPP, which had been 
used in Slovenia and Croatia to speed 
up ownership transformation and 
privatization. Although it was 
announced in 1996, MPP did not start 
until 2001. 
 
Privatization in BiH under the 
Marković Law from the end of 1989 to 
1991 had resulted in 585 SOEs being 
transformed by distribution and selling 
of a proportion of shares to employees, 
but none of them was fully privatized.45 
The newly elected authorities soon 
decided to review and halt the process 
with the reason that the companies were 
being sold cheaply. The halt followed 
re-nationalization of social property 
during the war (from 1992 to 1995) but 
the share of capital paid by employees 
was recognized and did not become 
subject to privatization since then.46 In 
                                                       
http://www.balkannetwork.org/info/Monet1
1.pdf  
45 Dragoljub Stojanov, “BIH Privatization 
and Workers Participation: the Case Study 
of ‘Agrokomerc,’ Company,”  (paper 
presented at the Eleventh Conference of the 
International Association for the Economics 
of Participation, Catholic University of 




46 Vesna Bojičić-Dželilović, Fikret Caušević 
and  Rajko Tomaš, “Bosnia and 
Herzegovina – Understanding Reform,” 
(Global Development Network Southeast 
Europe and the Vienna  Institute for 
International Economic Studies, Vienna, 
June 2004), available at: 
Kosovo, a dozen of SOEs in the 
Gjakova region that sold internal shares 
in the early 1990s remained with 
unclear ownership status as their shares 
paid for have not yet been recognized. 
Privatization of the rest of SOEs started 
in July 2003 under international 
administration, was halted in October of 
the same year and resumed after one 
year. The Kosovo Trust Agency or the 
institution in charge to carry out the 
privatization planned to complete the 
process by mid-2005, though nearly 
two years after that deadline it has fully 
privatized only half of over 500 SOEs, 
and that with enormous difficulties and 
controversies. Privatization in Kosovo 
proved to be the biggest challenge 
among CEE countries for the following 
reasons: i) Kosovo’s undefined political 
status; ii) consequences of emergency 
measures introduced by Serbia during 
the 1990s and Serbia’s attempts to 
legalize ownership claims made during 
that time; iii) too many stakeholders 
involved in managing the process 
(international administration, Kosovo’s 
institutions, and Serbia); iv) limited 
management capacities and non-
transparency.47 
                                                       
www.wiiw.ac.at/balkan/files/GDN_Underst
andingReform_BosniaHerzegovina.pdf  
47 Isa Mulaj, “Delayed Privatization in 
Kosovo: Causes, Consequences and 
Implications in the Ongoing Process,” in 
Path-dependent Development in the Western 
Balkans: The Impact of Privatization, ed. 
Siniša Kušić (Peter Lang: Frankfurt, 2005): 
123-163.  
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4.2 The impact of privatization 
methods on corporate governance and 
restructuring 
 
After the difficulties referred to earlier 
regarding implementation, the 
completion of the privatization process 
did not mean the end of challenges. 
Privatization is not a formal transfer of 
property rights; it implies a change in 
enterprise behavior and incentives, 
management, restructuring, and maybe 
the change in the environment. 
Privatized enterprises needed to adopt 
their activity according to market 
conditions, something which they could 
not do within a night given their long 
operation under different conditions. 
Adapting to the market conditions 
depended on corporate governance and 
restructuring. The type of corporate 
governance is largely determined by 
privatization methods.  
 
In companies where the sale of shares 
on favorable terms to insiders was used 
the main method of privatization, it 
resulted in dispersed ownership among 
many individual shareholders in 
Employee-owned Firms (EOFs). These 
group companies have their 
management largely similar to the past 
or pre-privatization period. The central 
decision-making body under self-
management – the Workers’ Council – 
has been replaced by the Shareholders’ 
Assembly, now resting on many 
individual shareholders with the right to 
vote. A slight difference is the presence 
of managerial shareholders whose 
shares account for a little more than 
those of the average or lower position 
employees, derived from the allocation 
of higher value of shares based on the 
managers’ higher level of salaries.  
 
Dispersed ownership was also an 
obstacle to restructuring of the 
companies. Insiders lacked capital to 
invest while they were no longer 
enjoying subsidies after privatization. 
Consequently, EOFs were forced to 
undergo defensive restructuring through 
downsizing of enterprise activities such 
as, reducing costs by closing down 
unprofitable activities, job cuts, and 
getting rid of outdated and non-
productive technology, to the extent 
that enabled them to compete in the 
short run.48 The need for greater 
enterprise restructuring and better 
corporate governance induces EOFs to 
sell their shares internally from workers 
to managers, and externally to the 
outside investors in the secondary 
privatization. Such a process happened 
in Slovenia with the aim to make 
dispersed ownership that resulted from 
privatization and MPP more 
concentrated. An analysis of the 
changes and shifts in ownership 
concentration after secondary 
privatization in 426 companies found 
that concentration occurred mainly 
from workers to managers but at a low 
level, having no major impact on 
enterprise performance.49 
                                                 
48 Irene Grosfeld and Gérard Roland, 
“Defensive and Strategic Restructuring in 
Central European Enterprises,” Journal of 
Transforming Economies and Societies 3 
(4:1996): 21-46. 
49 Simoneti, Marko, Andreja Böhm, Marko 
Rems, Matija Rojec, Jože P. Damijan and 




Corporate governance emerged as a 
much worse problem for SOEs 
privatized through MPP, especially in 
BiH and Montenegro. Too many 
citizens had no knowledge about the 
companies in which they became 
shareholders. In BiH the process neither 
contributed to economic recovery of the 
country nor attracted foreign investors 
as hoped. Many companies in the hands 
of insiders, unused shares in the 
portfolio of privatization investment 
funds, dispersed ownership and the lack 
of fresh capital for investment neglected 
enterprise restructuring.50  
 
The methods of privatization that 
favored insiders and the population, left 
little room for foreign investors to 
participate. In cases when they 
participated in privatization of SOEs 
wholly or partially, corporate 
governance and enterprise performance 
was better and more investment 
oriented. For example, foreign 
participation in Croatia brought positive 
changes in corporate governance by 
filling the gap of well-trained managers 
and incorporating better organizational 
practices.51 The need for fresh capital 
                                                       
Boris Majcen, “Secondary Privatisation in 
Slovenia: Evolution of Ownership Structure 
and Company Performance Following Mass 
Privatisation,” report no. 46 (Warsaw: 
Center for Social and Economic Research, 
2001).  
50 EBRD, Transition Report 2003: 
Integration and Regional Cooperation 
(London, EBRD). 
51 Drago Čengić, “Corporate Governance in 
Croatia: Present Problems and Measures for 
was felt during privatization in Serbia 
and that was why the new law on 
privatization passed in 2001 and 
amended in 2003 envisaged cash sales 
as the main privatization method 
intending to attract strategic investors. 
The answer to the question of 
privatization performance should be 
provided in two domains: its impact on 
national economy and efficiency at 
micro level. In self-management as 
already discussed in Section One, 
aggregate performance was satisfactory 
despite objections against certain 
aspects of enterprise behavior. Soft 
budget constraints, merging loss-
making and profitable enterprises 
explained that aggregate performance. 
At micro level, there were lazy workers 
supposed to have been benefiting from 
those working harder. Given that the 
workers were decision makers, they 
found it hard to penalize their 
colleagues for erosion of the working 
discipline which was taking place. In 
practice, this has questioned the theory 
that self-management enables better 
evolution of governance as a result of 
more liberal flow of information than in 
any other governance system.  
 
After privatization the situation is 
reversed. Those enterprises that 
survived competition indeed turned 
more profitable for existing workers 
thanks to downsizing and job cuts of 
                                                       
Possible Evolution of Corporate 
Governance,” (First Meeting of the South 
Eastern Europe Corporate Governance 
Roundtable, OECD, Romania, September 
20-21, 2001), available at: 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/22/2393207.pdf  
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low productivity workers. Looking at a 
broader picture of privatization reveals 
that losses in aggregate terms have 
outstripped gains at micro level, thus 
raising the social cost as a result of 
increase in unemployment. This maybe 
attributed to the theory related to the 
winners concentration in a small group.  
One would question if non-privatization 
could have been a better choice than 
privatization to insiders that followed 
deterioration in enterprise performance? 
Non-privatization could have had 
higher costs and this has proven in 
many empirical studies across CEE. 
Those studies found greater efficiency 
in privatized enterprises through 
different methods than non-privatized 
ones in terms of corporate governance, 
restructuring, productivity and 
incomes.52 This remark was addressed 
to the delayed privatization in Serbia, 
that had SOEs been transformed into 
EOFs, results could not have been 
worse.53 
 
5. Causes of smaller effects of 
privatization  
 
When the use of resources by a certain 
                                                 
52 Of course, SOEs in a better position had 
greater chances of being privatized earlier 
whereon this sometimes was used as an 
explanation for post-privatization better 
performance.  
53 Milica Uvalić, “Privatisation and 
Corporate Governance in Serbia (FR 
Yugoslavia)” (Global Development 
Network for Southeast Europe and the 
Vienna Institute for International Economic 
Studies, Vienna, 2001), available at: 
www.wiiw.ac.at/balkan/files/Uvalic.pdf  
owner or under a given system of rules 
of managing property rights appears 
inefficient, Ronald H. Coase stood for 
incentives of transferring these rights to 
someone who will make a better use of 
them, i.e. achieve greater efficiency.54 
One of the main requirements for that 
efficiency is to clearly define property 
rights and make them fully transferable, 
so competition would lead to efficient 
resource allocation. Sometimes it may 
be so and sometimes it may not. Even 
in competition circumstances 
reallocation of resources may be 
inefficient due to asymmetric 
information. It is difficult to anticipate a 
better use of resources if there is 
insufficient information about their past 
and current qualities and shortcomings 
such as social property in the course of 
privatization and its aftermath. 
 
The limited privatization at the Federal 
level associated with the monetary 
stabilization began to produce some 
positive results which Marković himself 
had not expected, but he soon realized 
that the further success above all 
required the stability in political 
domain.55 But not everything depended 
on politics; there were also deficiencies 
within the institutions that carried out 
the process, in particular after 
independence of the Yugoslav 
successor states.  
                                                 
54 Ronald H.Coase, “The Problem of Social 
Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics 3 
(1960): 1-44.  
55 Christopher Bennet, Yugoslavia’s Bloody 
Collapse: Causes, Course and 
Consequences (London: Hurst and 
Company, 1995). 
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5.1 External causes: the impact of 
disintegration of former Yugoslavia 
and thereafter 
  
One of the major factors that 
undermined prospects and results of 
privatization in the successor states of 
the former Yugoslavia (except in 
Slovenia), is the break-up of the 
Federation that began in 1991 with the 
independence of northern republics – 
Slovenia and Croatia. Disintegration 
continued with the separation of 
Macedonia, the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (1992 to 1995) and, 
finally, the war in Kosovo (1999), 
resulting in a complete disintegration of 
the Yugoslav market into republics and 
regions. These should be remembered 
as part of the initial conditions. 
 
The initial conditions in Croatia – the 
most developed republic after Slovenia, 
deteriorated severely with the outbreak 
of war which left a significant adverse 
impact on the economy in general. 
Damages were equal to three times the 
annual GDP of Croatia.56 The 
disadvantageous circumstances became 
even worse as Croatia redirected 
considerable and increasing proportion 
of her diminished resources to defense 
at the time it was trying to establish 
state institutions.57  
                                                 
56 Radimir Buljan, “Industrial Restructuring 
and its Effect to the Development,” 
(Proceedings of the Fourth International 
Conference on Enterprise in Transition, 
Faculty of Economics, Split, Split-Hvar, 
May 24-26, 2001): 2386-2403. 
57 At the height of war, the country with 
some 4 million inhabitants (excluding the 
The civil war in BiH stopped the 
process at the beginning, which then did 
not resume until the end of 1997. MPP 
in BiH did not attract the broad 
participation of citizens. Ethnicly 
controlled areas prevented minorities to 
participate in the process and use 
vouchers through privatization 
investment funds. The low public 
confidence in the process, a high level 
of corruption among the main players, 
and a lack of interest by foreigners, 
were some of the characteristics of 
voucher privatization in BiH.58  
 
Slow progress in Serbia and 
Montenegro during the 1990s was 
caused by: i) the United Nations 
sanctions against it; ii) the limited 
market; iii) the sharp decline in 
economic activity; iv) poor experience 
and constraints to implement and 
control privatization; iv) the low level 
                                                       
Serbs) had an army of 150,000 soldiers. In 
1995 the share of military expenditure to 
GDP reached 9.4%. See Ivo Bićanić, “The 
Economic Role of the State in Southeast 
European Economies in Transition” (The 
Vienna Institute for International Economic 
Studies, Vienna, 2002), available at: 
http://www.wiiw.ac.at/balkan/files/Bicanic.p
df    
58 Janez Prašnikar, Polona Domadenik, 
Aleksandra Gregorič, Bostjan Jazbec, and 
Mojmir Mrak, “Bosnia and Herzegovina” 
(Country Study Report Prepared for the 
Global Development Network, 2001), 
available at:  
www.cergeei.cz/pdf/gdn/grp_final_bosnia.p
df  
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of information and non-transparent 
procedures.59  
 
Under the impact of external factors 
such as the bloody collapse of the 
former Yugoslavia, economic decline 
would have happened even without 
privatization. However, what has 
impacted privatization as a process and 
enterprise performance afterwards, was 
the collapse of business networks not 
only with foreign countries, but also 
among the Yugoslav successor states. 
The disruption in the latter case was 
more costly for enterprises than, say for 
instance, republics of former Soviet 
Union, because, the Yugoslav SOEs 
were organized on the system of 
associated labor and had their supply 
network and subsidiaries spread across 
federal units. In peaceful time many of 
previous clusters could not be re-
established as some enterprises have 
gone bankrupt and/or reallocated 
resources dictated by market forces.  
 
5.2 Internal environment: behavior of 
institutions and enterprises  
  
It is obvious that managers and 
employees were the biggest 
beneficiaries of privatization where the 
sale of shares to insiders at favorable 
terms and conditions was used. The 
schema of allocation of social 
ownership discussed in Section 3.1 and 
                                                 
59 Veselin Vukotić, “Privatization in 
Montenegro” (Global Development 
Network for Southeast Europe and the 
Vienna Institute for International Economic 
Studies, Vienna, 2001), available at: 
www.wiiw.ac.at/balkan/files/Vukotic.pdf. 
presented in the Appendix, often 
resulted in different ownership 
proportions after privatization. In 
Slovenia employees ended up with the 
same ownership share of 40% as 
allocated.60 In Macedonia they got a 
much better deal than in Croatia and 
ended up with a majority ownership 
stakes in a slightly higher proportion of 
total number of SOEs than in Slovenia.  
 
Privatization after re-nationalization in 
Croatia was criticized for unfairness. 
Well-connected government officials 
and politicians of the ruling party in 
power for nearly 10 years, were the 
main net winners.61 The political 
capitalism in Croatia that emerged from 
this type of privatization caused public 
dissatisfaction.62 The resulting group of 
                                                 
60 Marko Simoneti and Aleksandra 
Gregorić, “Managerial Ownership and 
Corporate Performance in Slovenian Post-
Privatisation Period”, European Journal of 
Comparative Economics 1, (2: 2004): 217-
241.  
61 A public opinion poll in 1998 assessing 
the level of satisfaction with the 
privatisation results showed that around 
46.8% of the respondents were completely 
dissatisfied, 21.6% partially dissatisfied, 
13.3% could not assess the results, 16.9% 
partially satisfied, and only 1.4% completely 
satisfied. See Nevenka Čučković, 
“Privatisation in Central and Eastern 
Europe: Between Intentions and Reality” 
(Proceedings of the Third International 
Conference on ‘Enterprise in Transition, 
Faculty of Economics, Split, May 27-29, 
1999), 619-635.  
62 Josip Županov, “Tranzicija i politički 
kapitalizam (Transition and Political 
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political shareholders was described as 
“crony capitalism.”63 Something similar 
has happened in Serbia. After 
abolishing autonomous privatization, 
the state imposed control over 
enterprises. The newly appointed 
directors of SOEs, especially of large 
ones, embarked on running enterprises 
fraudulently.64 The public had 
suspicions that many of privatized 
SOEs through direct sale from 2001 
onwards, ended up in the hands of those 
who were believed to have earned their 
money during the 1990s through 
corruption and fraud.65 A high level of 
corruption and politicization was the 
result of privatization in BiH, too.  
 
Inefficiencies and inexperience of 
institutions and policy makers for 
carrying out privatization in a consistent 
way undermined the results 
significantly. They were able to make 
good plans, thought they had the needed 
capacities to complete the process as 
planned, but underestimated the 
challenge. The response to unexpected 
                                                       
Capitalism)”,  Hrvatska Gospodarska Revija 
12 (1997): 1399-1407. 
63 Bićanić, “The Economic Role of the 
State”, 9.   
64 Michael Palairet, “The Economic 
Consequences of Slobodan Milošević”, 
Europe-Asia Studies 53, 6 (2001): 903-919.  
65 Livija Maksimović, “Privatisation in 
Serbia in Conditions of Economic 
Stagnation” (Proceedings of the Second 
International Conference on From 
Transition to Development: Globalisation 
and Political Economy of Development in 
Transition Economies, Faculty of 
Economics, University of Sarajevo, 
Sarajevo, October 9-11, 2003), 1 (393-404). 
difficulties on the road by ad hoc and 
some ambiguous choices delayed 
completion of the process and made it 
more costly. It is actually happening in 
Kosovo as well in spite of a good 
opportunity to learn very useful lessons. 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
In self-management socialism, two 
crucial aspects lacked sufficient and 
careful attention: i) social ownership 
and social property; and ii) the 
operation and behavior of SOEs in 
reality. Depending on the extent to 
which their insights were blurry, they 
had implications in ownership claims 
against SOEs by various players whose 
stake was not known. I summarize this 
by maintaining that, although things 
appear to work well but inside have got 
some defects that are not properly 
observed and dealt with in time, then 
when it comes to the problems 
accumulated, attempts to further reform 
the system (as former Yugoslavia did in 
mid 1980s) are likely to lack 
perspective. This is why the final role 
of the state in this respect – to organize 
privatization and make ownership rights 
clearly defined, became an uneasy 
challenge. The blame has been laid 
mainly on the specific features of social 
ownership that distinguished it from 
state ownership and the problem of 
resolving the national question and the 
democratic environment.  
 
The experience of privatization 
involves similarities as well as 
differences depending on approaches, 
methods used, and the circumstances in 
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which the process evolved. The fact that 
the main method in the first 
privatization laws of the successor 
states remained the sale of enterprise 
assets to insiders on favorable terms, 
indicates that the Marković Law left a 
significant impact which lasted long 
after the disintegration of former 
Yugoslavia. There were deviations from 
this course anyway, e.g. when social 
ownership was re-nationalized (in 
Croatia, Serbia, and BiH), some SOEs 
were privatized through other methods 
(in Macedonia), or when a part was 
distributed to the population (MPP in 
Slovenia, Montenegro, and BiH).  
 
Privatization of social ownership was 
undertaken to improve efficiency and 
did so for a selective group, so in 
aggregate terms the losses outweighed 
gains. No doubt that there has always 
been a gap between the goals 
proclaimed and results achieved in 
privatization elsewhere. It does not 
imply that the plans were not good or 
that they were overambitious. The main 
reason was the limited institutional 
capacities and management skills 
necessary to carry out privatization. 
None of the countries had any 
experience in privatization and when it 
ran into difficulties, there was no 
experience or a ready diagnosis to deal 
with the problem effectively. Instead, 
other models were embarked on to cope 
with the problem and complete the 
process. This, indeed, accelerated and 
brought the process to an end, though it 
left a number of implications behind.  
When comparing the management of 
SOEs in the past and after their 
privatization to employees or EOFs, it 
can be concluded that it is similar with 
slight differences. During self-
management, employees were not the 
only ones managing SOEs; they had the 
support and influence of other players 
outside who acted as a sort of umbrella 
for employees. After privatization, the 
role of those players as it was 
disappeared and employees who were 
accustomed to that umbrella for a long 
time, found it difficult to do everything 
on their own. In cases when they came 
in joint ownership with the shareholders 
those who used to exercise their role in 
managing SOEs, there were difficulties 
because, in spite of being together 
again, their relations changed and 
different objectives emerged. Far more 
unsatisfactory performance came about 
when ownership was distributed to 
society (i.e. citizens) through MPP 
resulting in diffused ownership that 
weakened the mechanisms of corporate 
governance and prospects for 
restructuring.  
 
The answer to the basic question in this 
article, (Did privatization of social 
ownership matter for economic 
efficiency?) is a bit ambiguous. One 
explanation with respect to the theory 
of unclear and/or shared ownership 
rights, like in social ownership, is that 
they are likely to result in efficiency if 
an apparatus is to enforce incentive 
compatibility by minimizing the free 
riding problem. After privatization, 
individual or group interests within the 
firms under better piecemeal incentives 
for some at the expense of many others 
prevail in the short run. Was then 
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privatization necessary? The article 
showed that privatization was a must, 
but it took and will take time to produce 
greater results, perhaps longer than 
policy makers had anticipated. 
Henceforth another question arises: 
which type of ownership matters more 
in terms of overall economic 
efficiency? From a historical 
perspective it depends on how well 
ownership fits in the economic system 
and broader environment such as 
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Appendix I: Privatization in successor states of former Yugoslavia: methods, progress, and post-privatization results   
 Slovenia Croatia Macedonia Serbia Montenegro BiH Kosovo 
Total number of SOEs slated for 
privatization  
2,500a) 3,619b) 1,216c) 3,486d) 354e) 2,591f) 525 e) 
Year and the month the first privatization 
law was passed 
November 1992 April 1991 June 1993 August 1993 January 1992 December 1997 and 
June 1998  
June 2002 
Approaches to privatization Decentralized Highly centralized Decentralized Centralized Decentralized Highly decentralized Highly centralized 
Primary method of privatization  Employee buy-
outs 
Employee buy-outs Employee buy-
outs 
Employee buy-outs Employee buy-outs MPP Direct sales (spin-off)
Secondary method of privatization MPP MPP Direct sales None MPP Direct sales Liquidation  
Transfers to the funds   40%g) 30%h) 15%i) 40%j) Up to 60%k) 15% (RS)l) None  
Discount for insiders 50%g) 20%h) 30-50%i) 20%j) 30%k) None  None 
Additional discount per each year of 
employment  
None 1%h) 1%i) 1%j) 1%k) None  None 
Maximum discount to insiders 50%g) 60%h) 70%-90%i) 60%j) 70%k) None  20%n) 
Repayment period 5 yearsg) 5 years (20 years in 
the 2nd phase)h) 
5 yearsi) 5 yearsj) 10 yearsk) None  None  
Limits on sales of internal shares per 
employee (DM) 
None 20,000h) 25,000i) 20,000-30,000j) 18,000k) None None 
Progress with large scale privatization 
during the 1990s  
 Significant Moderate Moderate  fast until 1994; retreat 
and very slow  
Very slow Very slow or no 
progress 
No progress 
Slow since 2002 
Corporate governance Moderate  Weak   Poor  Very poor Very poor Very poor n/a 
Enterprise restructuring  Moderate   Little    Little  Very little Very little  Very little or none  n/a 
Private sector share to GDP (2002)n) 65% 60% 60% 45% n/a 45% n/a 
Privatization revenues as a share of GDP 
(in 2002)m) 
4.9% 15.8% n/a n/a  n/a 2.9% n/a 
Source: 
a)    EBRD, Transition Report 1994 (London: EBRD, 1994);                         b)   Nevenka Čučković, “The Privatisation Process and Its Consequences,” 76;      
c)    Privatization Agency of Macedonia, http://www.mpa.org.mk/, accessed on 25 December 2005;                                                                                                                                                   
d)    Mladen Lazić and Laslo Sekelj, “Privatisation in Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),” 1063;                                                                                                                                                 
e)    Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, Statistički Godišnjak Jugoslavije (Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia) (Beograd: Savremena Administracija, 1990), 428; 
f) Privatization Agency of the Federation of BiH and of Republika Srpska, available at: http://www.apf.com.ba/ , and  www.rs.privatizacija.com;  
g) Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 55/92, Articles 22, 23, and 25;                  h)    Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia,  No. 84/92, Articles 25 and 31; 
i) Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No. 38/93, Articles 26 and 28;      j)    Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 48/91, Articles 16 and 17; 
k) Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, No. 2/92, Articles 7, 8, 9 and 11;       l)    Official Gazette of the Republika Srpska No. 24/98, Article 26;                                       
m)   EBRD, Transition Report 2002: Agriculture and Rural Transition (London: EBRD, 2002);      
n)    Not a discount but the share of proceeds from the sale of SOEs going to workers according to provisions of the Regulation No. 2002/2 on the establishment of the KTA (amended 
by   Regulation No. 2005/18); 
and authors own compilation
